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of Description and of ExperienceA new study suggests that individuals differentially recruit neural regions
associated with decision making, depending on whether the information about
the options are learned through experience or merely described.Ryan K. Jessup
and John P. O’Doherty
The ability to make good decisions
about future courses of action under
conditions of uncertainty is essential
for the survival of most animals,
including humans. There is a broad
consensus among those who study
decision making, whether from
a theoretical, behavioural or
neurobiological perspective, that
decisions are typically made through
evaluating the expected future benefit
(or ‘value’) that will accrue from
choosing each available option and
then comparing between those values
in order to select the option yielding
the largest expected reward [1,2].
When the outcomes of options are
uncertain, we must also consider the
degree of uncertainty (or ‘risk’) present
[3]. However, recent findings have
suggested that the manner in which
information is acquired — whetherlearned or described — fundamentally
alters the choice an individual makes
[4–6]. A new study reported in this issue
of Current Biology [7] follows on these
behavioural findings, revealing that
neural regions are differentially
activated depending on whether
information about options was
acquired through experience versus
description.
In studies of the neural basis of
decision making, neuroimaging
experiments in humans and
neurophysiological recordings in
other animals are typically concerned
with evidence for neural signals related
to expected value, and these have
revealed a network of brain regions,
including (but not limited to) the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(incorporating the medial prefrontal
and orbital frontal cortex in the frontal
lobes) [8,9], the parietal cortex [10], and
the ventral striatum in the basal ganglia
[11,12] (Figure 1A). Neural correlates ofrisk have also been found, particularly
in the anterior insular cortex [13,14]
as well as in the anterior cingulate
cortex [15] (Figure 1B). Decision
neuroscientists have elucidated these
findings by setting up experimental
situations in which their human or
animal subjects are presented with
choices between varieties of different
options. By varying the amount of
a reward (such as a monetary gain,
or a squirt of juice) available and the
probability of obtaining that reward, it
has been possible to experimentally
manipulate value and risk while
simultaneously measuring changes in
neural activity.
There are a number of different ways
in which the key information about how
much reward and what the probability
is of obtaining that reward can be
conveyed to the experimental subject.
One approach, called the ‘descriptive
method’, is to provide an explicit
description of the relevant variables
associated with each decision option
(Figure 2A). For example, a decision
trial could be presented as follows:
‘‘If you choose option A, there is a 50%
probability that you will receive two
dollars, otherwise you will receive
nothing, whereas if you choose option
B, you will receive 1 dollar for certain.’’
A clear advantage of this approach is
that it is very easy for an experimenter
AB
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Figure 1. Neuroanatomical substrates of decision variables. (A) Regions known to contain
valuation signals include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (colored in red), the striatum
(blue) and the parietal cortex (green), shown overlaid on a normalized structural MRI scan at
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates: [26, 25, 15]. (B) Regions known to encode
risk signals include anterior cingulate (red) and anterior insula (blue) shown at MNI coordi-
nates: [22, 21, 28].
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associated with an option by just
changing the descriptors used on
each trial.
In the alternative ‘experiential
method’, decision variables are not
presented explicitly, but instead must
be learned by the subject through trial
and error (Figure 2B). As before, each
option is associated with a unique
stimulus or action, but in this case
the overt depiction of the option bears
no lawful relation to the underlying
decision variables associated with
that option. Instead, the subject must
come to acquire such information
through repeated experience of the
outcomes available from that option.
An advantage of this method is that it
is probably a closer approximation
of how information about relevant
decision variables is acquired in the
real world. It is also the dominant
approach used to study decision
making in animals other than humans
(though for a clever example of the
descriptive approach in non-humanprimates, see [9]). A disadvantage of
the experiential approach is that it is
harder as an experimenter to keep
track of the subjects’ underlying
subjective representation of the
relevant decision variables, as these
will vary over time and across
individuals as a function of differences
in experience.
It has become increasingly apparent
in the behavioural decision-making
literature that these different
approaches to the experimental study
of decision making differ not only in
the nature of information provision,
but also in theway inwhich theacquired
information is ultimately used to guide
decisions [4–6]. In spite of this
burgeoning behavioural evidence,
neurobiological studies of decision
making to date have failed to address
the extent to which differences in
presentationmightpotentially influence
the underlying neural representations
of those variables.
FitzGerald et al. [7] addressed this
question head on. These authors useda hybrid decision-making task, in which
information about the value and risk
associated with some decision options
were acquired only experientially, while
for other options this information was
provided descriptively. They then
scanned human subjects by functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
while they made choices between
these options, enabling the authors
to compare and contrast brain regions
involved when encoding decision
variables acquired through experience
or through description.
Consistent with many previous
results, the authors found that activity
of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
and the striatum correlated with
expected value, while the anterior
insula andanterior cingulate cortexwas
correlated with risk. Intriguingly,
however, these areas were found to be
differentially engaged under the
different presentation conditions: the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex was
significantly more involved when the
value of the chosen option had been
acquired through learned experience,
whereas the ventral putamen, a part of
the ventral striatum,wasmore engaged
when the value of the chosen option
hadbeen acquired throughdescription.
For risk, the anterior insulawas found to
bemore involved when information had
been acquired through description,
while the anterior cingulate showed
greater correlations with risk when
information about the chosen option
had been acquired through learning.
These results indicate that decision
variables generated on the basis of
explicit provision of descriptive
information are not processed neurally
in the same way as decision variables
acquired on the basis of trial and error
learning. It is important to note, as
acknowledged by the authors [5], that
the brain systems identified in the two
different conditions are unlikely to be
exclusively involved in one or other
type of decision making. For instance,
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex has
previously been found to represent
decision values also under conditions
involving provision of descriptive
information [8,16], while fMRI studies
have found activity in the ventral
striatum to be correlated with
prediction errors, a key signal thought
to play a role in trial and error learning,
particularly of stimulus-outcome
associations [17,18]. A similar story
holds true for risk signals in the anterior
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Figure 2. Example option presentation and computation methods.
(A) The descriptive method explicitly states the probability of each possible outcome occurring
from each of the two options displayed. Here, the probability of each outcome is conveyed by
the area of the circle covered by each color. Expected utility is a typical algorithm used to
express descriptive choice and a specific instantiation is shown. The expected utility EU for
each option is separately calculated by multiplying the utilities of each outcome x by the prob-
ability p(x) of the outcome occurring and summing the products. The utility of each outcome is
obtained by raising the outcome x by the utility parameter a. If a = 1, then EU is equivalent to
the expected value. (B) The experiential method conveys no information about the reward
distribution at presentation. Instead, the reward distribution must be learned through repeated
play and the reception of outcome feedback. Reinforcement learning is typically used to
express experiential choice and a specific instantiation is shown. The learned value Q on trial t
for a particular option is calculated by summing the learned value on the previous trial Q(t 2 1)
with the product of the learning rate parameter l and the difference of the reward received on
the previous trial R(t 2 1) and Q(t – 1), a difference also known as a prediction error.
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interpreted as suggesting that these
neural systems may be differentially
modulated as a function of the way
in which the information is acquired.
More generally, the new findings [5]
add to an emerging literature
suggesting that the manner in which
a decision problem is posed may
significantly influence the underlying
neural processes recruited to resolve
it [19,20]. Even subtle differences intasks favoured by different research
groups could potentially contribute
to differences in the underlying
engagement of neural systems.
An important future direction will be to
begin to unravel precisely what factors
pertaining to the ‘framing’ of decision
problems contribute to the recruitment
of different neural mechanisms, as
a stepping stone to understanding how
this affects the computations being
performed during the decision process.References
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